The flagship grade — the one Aramco's OSP is built around. Sets the price signal for Kuwait, Iraq, Iran and Qatar, all of which price relative to Arab Light. The single most important crude in the global pricing system.
Requires a cracking or hydrocracking refinery. Japan's JXTG, India's Reliance, China's Sinopec are all configured to run it. Cannot easily be replaced by North Sea light sweet grades without significant yield loss.
Requires the most complex coking refineries. The discount to Arab Light ($4.20/bbl in March 2026) is near its widest in 18 months — signalling that complex refinery capacity is constrained and buyers prefer lighter grades during the crisis.
The widening Light-Heavy spread is a crisis signal: it shows that heavy sour crude is becoming harder to place because the complex refineries configured to process it are operating at reduced rates or facing feedstock disruption.
ADNOC launched Murban as an ICE futures contract in 2021, making it the Gulf's first exchange-traded benchmark grade. Higher API and lower sulphur than Arab Light makes it processable in a wider range of refineries.
The critical advantage during the crisis: Murban can be exported via Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, bypassing Hormuz. UAE's bypass capacity (~1.5M bbl/d through Fujairah) is the only meaningful Gulf alternative to Hormuz for crude exports.
Iraq's primary export grade — the second-largest single-origin crude stream in Asia-Pacific trade. Very sour with medium-heavy gravity, requiring complex refinery configurations.
100% export halt since March 2026. Refineries in China and India that were running Basra as 20-30% of their feedstock are scrambling to replace a heavy sour grade with limited alternatives. The nearest substitutes are Iranian Heavy (sanctioned), Venezuelan (under sanctions), or Arab Heavy (now at record OSP premium).
Similar in character to Arab Light but slightly heavier and sourer. Priced at a modest discount to Arab Light — the OSP typically runs $0.50–1.00/bbl below. Kuwait has zero alternative export routes: all oil exits via Mina al-Ahmadi terminal into the Gulf, 100% Hormuz-dependent.
Kuwait ran out of available storage within 14 days of Hormuz disruption and began systematic production curtailments. Storage tanks filled faster than any bypass option could empty them.
The Dubai Mercantile Exchange settlement price — Oman and Dubai crudes averaged — underpins OSP differentials for all major Gulf producers exporting to Asia. When Aramco says "Arab Light Asia = +$2.50 vs Oman/Dubai," this is the reference.
Currently broken as a benchmark. The Platts assessment that feeds the DME settlement is based on physical transactions — and physical Gulf transactions have collapsed to near-zero since Hormuz disruption. Indian refiners are now challenging the entire 30-year pricing architecture as a result.
Similar in specification to Arab Light — medium sour — but exported via Black Sea (Novorossiysk) and Baltic (Primorsk/Ust-Luga). No Hormuz dependency whatsoever. This is why India's diversification into Russian crude since 2022 provides genuine partial insulation from the current crisis.
The discount (~$20/bbl vs Brent) makes it extremely attractive for Indian refiners who can configure for sour crude. The question during the current crisis is whether Russia can physically scale up exports to compensate for Gulf shortfalls — and whether the shadow fleet tankers can handle the volumes.
Delivered via pipeline directly to northeast China — no sea transit required, no Hormuz, no Western sanctions enforcement point. China's single most reliable crude supply in the current crisis environment.
Light sweet specification makes it processable in simple refineries — a significant advantage. China does not need its most complex refineries to run ESPO. The 1.6M bbl/d pipeline flow to China is entirely unaffected by the Hormuz closure.
Tengizchevroil production (Chevron, ExxonMobil, KazMunayGas) flows via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium to Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, then by tanker to European and Asian markets. No Hormuz dependency.
Very light and relatively low sulphur — processable in simple refineries. European buyers who lost access to Russian Urals have increased CPC offtake. Kazakhstan's chronic overproduction of OPEC+ quotas means supply is consistently available.
The ICE Brent futures contract — the world's most traded commodity — is now a basket of North Sea grades (Brent, Forties, Oseberg, Ekofisk, Troll). Physical production is modest (~700K bbl/d net) but the futures price anchors global trade.
The disconnect problem: Brent futures are priced in London for North Sea delivery. Gulf physical crude cannot reach that delivery point when Hormuz is closed. This is why the Arab Light OSP vs Brent spread has blown out to +$11.84 — the benchmark and the physical market are pricing different realities.
Europe's anchor crude supply. Despite its medium-heavy gravity, its extremely low sulphur content (0.08%) means it can run in simple refineries that would normally require light sweet crude. This is its key competitive advantage — broad refinery compatibility.
Cannot replace Gulf sour crude in complex Asian refineries configured for medium-sour grades — the sulphur removal units in those refineries are not needed for Johan Sverdrup, creating a processing mismatch even if the crude were available in sufficient volume.
WTI Cushing is the benchmark for US crude. US exports (primarily WTI Midland and WTI Houston) have grown dramatically since the 2015 export ban was lifted, reaching ~5M bbl/d. No Hormuz exposure whatsoever — all export via Gulf of Mexico ports.
The key constraint for Asian buyers: WTI is too light and too sweet for the complex sour-crude refineries in Japan, South Korea, and China that were configured for Arab Medium or Basra. Switching a coking refinery from Arab Heavy to WTI shale is not a simple feedstock swap — it requires significant operational adjustment and yield loss.
Nigeria's flagship export grade — light sweet, processable in simple or cracking refineries. Historically priced at a premium to Brent. Nigerian production is chronically below OPEC+ quota due to pipeline theft, sabotage, and infrastructure decay.
During the Hormuz crisis, Bonny Light has attracted strong Asian spot buying from South Korea and Japan as buyers seek light sweet alternatives to UAE grades they can no longer easily access. However, Nigeria's production reliability is a significant constraint on how much volume can actually be committed.
One of the world's lightest crudes — 46° API and nearly sulphur-free. Exported directly to Mediterranean refineries via pipeline and tanker, zero Hormuz exposure. Europe's original light sweet alternative.
Its very light specification means it cannot substitute for medium-heavy Gulf grades in complex refineries. Algerian production is declining due to mature field depletion. Volume constraints limit its role as a crisis-period replacement.